Basic Emotions, Complex Emotions, Machiavellian Emotions by Griffiths, Paul E.
 Basic Emotions, Complex Emotions, Machiavellian Emotions1 
Paul E. Griffiths, 
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, 
University of Pittsburgh, 
Pittsburgh, 
PA 15232, 
USA 
 
pauleg@pitt.edu 
 
Abstract 
The current state of knowledge in psychology, cognitive neuroscience and behavioral 
ecology allows a fairly robust characterization of at least some, so-called ‘basic 
emotions’ - short-lived emotional responses with homologues in other vertebrates. 
Philosophers, however are understandably more focused on the complex emotion 
episodes that figure in folk-psychological narratives about mental life, episodes such as 
the evolving jealousy and anger of a person in an unraveling sexual relationship. One of 
the most pressing issues for the philosophy of emotion is the relationship between basic 
emotions and these complex emotion episodes. In this paper, I add to the list of existing, 
not necessarily incompatible, proposals concerning the relationship between basic 
emotions and complex emotions. I analyze the writings of ‘transactional’ psychologists of 
emotion, particularly those who see their work as a contribution to behavioral ecology, 
and offer a view of the basic emotion that focuses as much on their interpersonal 
functions as on their intrapersonal functions. Locating basic emotions and their 
evolutionary development in a context of processes of social interaction, I suggest, 
provides a way to integrate our knowledge of basic emotions into an understanding of the 
larger emotional episodes that have more obvious implications for philosophical 
disciplines such as moral psychology. 
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1. Emotion Episodes 
According to the distinguished philosopher Richard Wollheim, an emotion is an extended 
mental episode that originates when events in the world frustrate or satisfy a pre-existing 
desire (Wollheim, 1999). This leads the subject to form an attitude to the world which 
colors their future experience, leading them to attend to one aspect of things rather than 
another, and to view the things they attend to in one light rather than another. The idea 
that emotions arise from the satisfaction or frustration of desires - the ‘match-mismatch’ 
view of emotion etiology - has had several earlier incarnations in the psychology of 
emotion2. Early versions of this proposal were associated with the attempt to replace the 
typology of emotion found in ordinary language with a simpler theory of drives and to 
define new emotion types in terms of general properties such as the frustration of a drive. 
The match-mismatch view survived the demise of that revisionist project and is found 
today in theories that accept a folk-psychological-style taxonomy of emotion types based 
on the meaning ascribed by the subject to the stimulus situation. For example, the match-
mismatch view forms part of the subtle and complex model of emotion episodes 
developed over many years by Nico Frijda (Frijda, 1986). According to Frijda, 
information about the ‘situational antecedents’ of an emotion - the stimulus in its context, 
including the ongoing goals of the organism - is evaluated for its relevance to the 
multiple concerns of the organism. Evaluation of match-mismatch - the degree of 
compatibility between the situation and the subject’s goals - forms part of this process. 
                                                 
2 See, for example, (Mandler, 1984).  
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The result of the evaluation process is an understanding of the situation in terms of the 
possible actions it affords and the urgency of adopting a course of action. This 
understanding may in turn initiate physiological changes readying the organism for action 
and the formation of dispositions to act on various anticipated contingencies. Each stage 
of the emotion process is regulated by cognitive activity outside the emotion process 
itself, and the whole emotion process operates in a ‘continual updating’ mode leading to a 
varied emotion episode, rather than ‘running its course’ to result in a single emotion. 
Many other ‘cognitive appraisal’ theories of emotion share Frijda’s conception of an 
ongoing process of evaluation with feedback and hence are theories of emotion episodes 
rather than theories of the elicitation of a single emotion. But at the heart of all these 
models are claims about the features of the emotion-eliciting situation that lead to the 
production of one emotion or another at some point in the episode. These claims are 
usually expressed as a set of dimensions against which the situation is assessed, one of 
which often corresponds to match-mismatch. Many theorists label points in the resulting 
evaluation hyperspace with the names of emotion categories, which would seem to imply 
that the type-identity of an emotion is determined by the evaluation process3.  
 
Research in the ‘dimensional appraisal’ tradition consists mainly in documenting the 
association of regions in the hyperspace defined by the proposed dimensions of 
evaluation with particular emotional responses. Frijda’s model has been criticized for its 
very comprehensiveness - its desire to account for every finding documented in this rich 
                                                 
3 For a review of appraisal theories, see (Scherer, 1999). 
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empirical literature (Scherer, 1999). This form of criticism is well known to philosophers 
of science from the example of Darwin’s 1868 theory of pangenesis. A comprehensive 
theory that fits all the known data is unable to perform one of the vital functions of 
theory, which is to contradict the ‘facts’, leading to their reexamination and the 
progressive transformation of the empirical base. In contrast to Darwin’s theory of 
pangenesis, Mendelian genetics contradicted not only much accepted low-level theory 
about heredity but also contradicted what appeared to be the simple, factual outcome of 
many breeding experiments. One might hope that a psychological theory of emotion 
would have the same effect - leading us to reexamine some of our existing beliefs. 
 
Appraisal theorists have also become sensitive to the charge that their models are not 
based on the reality of emotion processes, but rather on the image of those processes 
recorded in folk-wisdom. This is because appraisal models have traditionally been tested 
by asking people who have experienced a particular emotion to report on the appraisal 
process, or even by asking people to report on the relevance of certain dimensions of 
evaluation to certain emotion concepts. This comes close to ‘conceptual analysis by 
numbers’ or, as the leading appraisal theorist Klaus Scherer has expressed it, to studies 
that “do little more than explicate the implicational semantic structures of our emotion 
vocabulary" (Scherer, 1999: 655). This challenge to appraisal theory can be met in a 
number of ways, including studies that manipulate situational factors relevant to the 
dimensions of appraisal and predict the resultant change in emotion, and studies that rely 
on objective measures of emotion rather than self-report. The ongoing effort to test 
appraisal theories as theories of emotion, rather than as elucidations of folk theory, has 
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led to a consensus that emotions do not walk in step with cognitive evaluation of the 
stimulus unless the notion of ‘cognitive evaluation’ is broadened to include sub-personal 
processes (Teasdale, 1999). Appraisal theorists have come to accept that even such 
apparently conceptually complex dimensions of evaluation as Richard Lazarus’s ‘core 
relational themes’ (Lazarus, 1991) can be assessed: 1. Without the information evaluated 
being available to other cognitive processes, 2. Before perceptual processing of the 
stimulus has been completed, and 3. Using only simple, sensory concepts to define the 
property that has to be identified. Some evidence supporting such ‘multi-level appraisal 
theories’ will be considered at more length in section three, as will their philosophical 
implications. 
 
2. Basic Emotions  
The emotion episodes which are the main focus of Wollheim’s work, and that of other 
well-known philosophers4, are very different entities from the most intensively studied 
emotions - the so-called ‘basic emotions’ of the Tomkins-Izard-Ekman tradition 
(Griffiths, 2001).  Research on the basic emotions began in the 1860s with Darwin’s 
efforts to reveal the ‘true and original’ forms of human emotional behavior. Having found 
painting and sculpture too dominated by convention to be of any use for this purpose, he 
took the innovative step of using photographs to establish which facial expressions were 
reliably recognized as indicating certain emotions by men and women in England. 
Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Darwin, 1872) is 
illustrated with many of the wonderful images he used in these experiments, some taken 
                                                 
4 e.g. (Greenspan, 1988; Greenspan, 1995; Nussbaum, 2001) 
 6
from life and others posed by hired actors. Then, as he so often did, Darwin used his 
network of correspondents across the world to extend his investigations. In search of 
indigenous peoples not corrupted by exposure to European facial expressions Darwin 
contacted colonists at the edges of European expansion. In Australia, for example, he 
contacted a missionary in ‘a remote part of Gippsland’ and another correspondent who 
had ventured ‘several hundred miles in the interior of Queensland’. Neglected for 
decades, Darwin’s ideas on emotion were revived by animal behaviorists like Konrad 
Lorenz in the 1950s and were spectacularly confirmed in the 1960s. In one famous series 
of experiments the American psychologist Paul Ekman, again searching for subjects not 
exposed to European cultural conventions, worked amongst the Fore people of the New 
Guinean highlands. Using an ingenious experimental design that avoided the problem of 
translating the names of emotions into another language Ekman showed his subjects 
photographs of actors posing facial expressions associated with certain emotions. Then he 
asked them to pick out the face of a character in a story - a man sitting at the bedside of 
his dead child, for example, or a man unexpectedly confronted by a wild pig. The Fore 
informants reliably identified the correct faces - those Westerners would label as sadness 
and fear. Ekman also filmed the faces of Fore people acting out some of the same 
incidents and students back in the United States proved equally adept at identifying the 
intended emotion from these films (Ekman, 1972). At around the same time, human 
ethologists demonstrated the early emergence of some of these expressions in human 
infants (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1973) and primatologists reasserted the homology between 
human facial expressions and those of non-human primates (Chevalier-Skolnikoff, 1973). 
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So for the past thirty years, there has been a consensus that certain ‘basic emotions’ are 
found in all human cultures. These are commonly called fear, anger, disgust, sadness, joy 
and surprise (not to be confused with the simpler, reflex-like startle response). Naturally 
enough, when used in this context all these emotion words refer to phenomena less rich 
and varied than those they refer to in common speech. Each basic emotion has a 
distinctive facial expression and for most of them there is evidence of distinctive 
physiological responses, distinctive changes in the voice and evidence of cognitive 
phenomena like focusing attention on the emotion stimulus. Psychologists have disputed 
whether the basic emotions are really basic, that is, whether the other emotions are really 
all based on these six. They have also disputed whether the basic emotions are emotions, 
suggesting instead that they are mere building blocks that form parts of more complex 
psychological states, and that it is these complex states that better deserve the name 
‘emotions’. Emotions or not, however, the basic emotions clearly form part of what is 
going on in emotion episodes. The characteristic facial and other behaviors associated 
with the basic emotions are one criterion by which people apply emotion terms. 
Homologous and analogous states in animals are normally called emotions and both 
biologists and neuroscientists take it for granted that human emotions are some kind of 
elaboration of these animal emotions.  Finally, the basic emotions are almost the only 
affective phenomena about which there is a strong consensus in the scientific literature.  
A philosophical theory of emotion must have some way, however dismissive, of 
accommodating these empirical findings. My own view is that rather than dismissing 
them, we can build on these findings about basic emotions to obtain insights into the 
nature of the more complex emotions that are of primary interest to philosophers. 
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3. ‘Affective primacy’ and ‘twin-pathway’ models of emotion 
A controversial claim associated with research into the basic emotions is the ‘affective 
primacy thesis’. Affective primacy means that emotional responses are independent of 
the rational evaluations we make of things; that we can be afraid of things that we know 
are not dangerous and angry about things we firmly believe to be just. In contrast, the 
‘cognitive’ tradition in the philosophy of emotion has treated the connections between 
emotion and beliefs and desires about as set of conceptual truths (Deigh, 1994; Griffiths, 
1989). Robert Solomon states that: 
"all emotions presuppose or have as their preconditions, certain sorts of 
cognitions - an awareness of danger in fear, recognition of an offense in anger, 
appreciation of someone or something as lovable in love. Even the most hard-
headed neurological or behavioral theory must take account of the fact that no 
matter what the neurology or the behavior, if a person is demonstrably ignorant of 
a certain state of affairs or facts, he or she cannot have certain emotions." 
(Solomon, 1993: 11).  
Many psychologists, however, claim to have demonstrated experimentally that emotions 
can occur in the absence of the relevant cognitions. The best known of these is Robert 
Zajonc, who showed that subjects can form preferences for stimuli to which they have 
been have been exposed subliminally so that their ability to identify those stimuli remains 
at chance levels (Zajonc, 1980). Many results have since been obtained which confirm 
Zajonc’s discovery. Arne Öhman and his collaborators have conditioned subjects to 
dislike angry faces and subsequently elicited the conditioned emotional response when 
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those angry faces were masked by neutral faces so that subjects reported no conscious 
experience of them (Esteves & Öhman, 1993; Öhman, 1986). In a later study, subjects 
were exposed to subliminal images of snakes, spiders, flowers and mushrooms. Although 
the subjects showed no ability to identify which stimulus they had been exposed to, 
subjects with previously established snake phobia showed elevated skin conductance 
responses to the snake images and subjects with spider phobia showed this response to 
the spider images (Öhman & Soares, 1994)5.   
 
The original controversy aroused by Zajonc’s results concerned whether emotions 
involve a ‘cognitive evaluation of the stimulus’ (Lazarus, Coyne, & Folkman, 1984; 
Zajonc, 1984a, 1984b). It has become clear that this was not a helpful formulation, and 
that what is really at issue is whether the information processing that leads to an 
emotional response is separate from that which leads to paradigmatically cognitive 
processes such as conscious report and recall, and whether the two kinds of information 
processing are different in kind.  The predominant view at the present time is that 
emotions involve states that are, in some sense, representational and which constitute, in 
some sense, an evaluation of the stimulus (Charland, 1997; Izard, 1992; Lazarus, 1999). 
These states, however, can occur at many ‘levels’ (in a sense to be clarified below) and 
an evaluation that leads to an emotion can be separate from, and can contradict, the 
evaluation of the same stimulus that is verbally reportable and integrated with the 
organisms other reportable beliefs. Under normal conditions, of course, the beliefs a 
subject has about an emotion stimulus match their emotional response to that stimulus, 
                                                 
5 For a brief overview, see (Öhman, 2002). 
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but this is not always the case, and the affective primacy thesis was basically correct in its 
assertion that even under normal conditions there are two (or more) processes going on 
(Ekman, 1980; Griffiths, 1990; Rozin, 1976; Zajonc, 1980). In Paul Ekman’s work these 
ideas are embodied in his concept of an ‘automatic appraisal mechanism’ - a cognitive 
subsystem dedicated to determining whether a stimulus will elicit an basic emotion and 
able to operate independently of the cognitive systems that lead to conscious, verbally 
reportable appraisals of the same stimulus.  
 
This ‘twin-pathway’ approach to the elicitation of emotion has been solidly confirmed in 
the case of fear by the neuroscientist Joseph LeDoux (LeDoux, 1996; LeDoux, 1993). 
LeDoux distinguishes between  ‘cognitive computations’ which yield information about 
stimuli and the relations between them, and ‘affective computations’ which yield 
information about the significance of stimuli for the organism and lead to physiological 
and behavioral responses appropriate to that significance. In fear, and probably at least 
some other basic emotions, key aspects of affective computation occur in the amygdala. 
The emotional evaluation of a stimulus can be driven by inputs at various levels of 
analysis. At a very early stage of perceptual processing, minimally processed data from 
thalamic sensory relay structures follows the ‘low road’ to the amygdala. This is the 
ultimate 'quick and dirty' route to rapid emotional response. Meanwhile, perceptual 
information follows a slower ‘high road’ to the visual, auditory, somatosensory, gustatory 
and olfactory cortices, projections from which to the amygdala allow responses to stimuli 
in a single, sensory modality. Lesions to these pathways inhibit emotional responses to 
stimulus features in the corresponding modalities. Finally, the amygdala receives inputs 
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from brain regions associated with full-blown, polymodal, perceptual representations of 
the stimulus situation and with memory, allowing the emotional response to be triggered 
by complex, contextual features of the stimulus. However it is triggered, it is the final 
response in the amygdala that is associated with fear conditioning, and conditioned fear 
responses to simple sensory-perceptual stimuli have been shown to be relatively hard to 
modify. 
 
Twin (or multiple) pathway models of emotion have considerable implications for the 
theories of emotion episodes discussed in section one. They bolster existing concerns 
about the extent to which self-report data accurately reflect actual emotion processes. As 
Öhman puts it: "Thus, rather than being an important factor in the shaping of emotion, as 
assumed by most cognitively-oriented emotion theorists..., from the present perspective, 
conscious cognitive mechanisms enter late in the sequence of events, with the primary 
aim of finding some order in and evaluating what is going on. Therefore, self-reports may 
be a misleading route to the understanding of emotion..."  (Öhman, 1999: 345). Findings 
like those of LeDoux have also increased the attraction of multi-level appraisal theories 
(Teasdale, 1999), which preserve the guiding insight that emotional states are directed 
onto states of affairs in the world without having to force emotions onto the procrustean 
bed of the traditional ‘cognitive theory’ of emotion. 
 
Twin pathway models also have major implications for the philosophy of emotion, as I 
have argued elsewhere (Griffiths, 1990, 1997). What is at stake for philosophers is our 
ability to discover the nature of emotional processes by exploring the semantic relations 
between emotion terms. This approach rests on the idea that emotions are mental 
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representations and that emotional cognition manipulates these representations on the 
basis of their representational content. Hence emotional processes can be explored via the 
semantic ‘logic’ of emotions. Solomon’s strictures on any future neuroscience, quoted 
above, depend on just this assumption. But twin-pathway models suggest that emotional 
representations are separate from representations of the same objects used for purposes 
and perhaps also different in kind.  The ‘separateness’ (e.g. modularity or informational 
encapsulation) of emotional representations means that the way in which emotional and 
other representations interact, if they interact at all, depends on details of cognitive 
architecture as well as on the content of the representations. This architecture, of course, 
cannot be determined by studying the logical relations between emotion words.  If, in 
addition, emotional representations are different in kind from other representations, then 
further problems arise. Contemporary naturalized theories of mental representation 
envisage the existence of several grades of representation (Dretske, 1981, 1988; Millikan, 
1984). Many of the fine-grained semantic distinctions we make in natural language may 
fail to get a grip on representational states with more coarse-grained semantics. Millikan 
has also suggested that primitive mental representations may unite the functions of beliefs 
and desires in a single, undifferentiated functional role. Stephen Stich has explored the 
possibility that ‘sub-doxastic’ mental representations may fail to respect the logical 
operations that we expect to govern full-fledged beliefs (Stich, 1983). A good, and close, 
analogy is that between emotional representations and states of the early stages of visual 
processing. The states of edge and motion detectors in the visual system, for example, are 
clearly ‘representations’ in some general sense of that term, but we do not expect to be 
able to characterize the representational content of these states using sentences of English 
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while preserving all the semantic and inferential properties of those sentences! The 
representational content of an edge detector is only vaguely gestured at by the sentence 
“This is an edge” and this is not because of a lack of work on the ‘logic of edges’. If 
emotional representations are, as research suggests, separate, and perhaps qualitatively 
distinct, from conscious, verbally reportable representations of the same stimuli, then 
traditional philosophical analysis of the ‘logic’ of fear and anger must be reconceived as 
akin to the ‘logic’ of memory or the ‘logic’ of perception. Such analytic projects 
represent the elucidation of a folk theory of the mind and are potentially as important as 
studies of folk-physics or ethnobiology, but they bear only an indirect and problematic 
relationship to the psychology of emotion. Failure to distinguish between elucidating the 
folk theory and studying emotion processes themselves is unlikely to lead to a good 
account of either. 
 
4. Beyond the basic emotions  
After this brief sketch of the basic emotions literature, I want to explore how we might 
build on the understanding of these emotions to model the complex emotions that 
mediate human social interaction; the emotions that are of greatest interest to 
philosophers, particularly aestheticians and moral psychologists. Numerous suggestions 
already exist as to how to do this. Some contemporary evolutionary psychologists believe 
that we can understand human emotion by straightforwardly extending the basic 
emotions approach to the rest of our emotional lives. Even a person’s capacity to  
‘experience existential dread by considering their own death’ may be an adaptation to 
some specific problem in human evolution (Gaulin & McBurney, 2001: 266). Following 
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this strategy, David Buss argues that the brain houses specialized circuits devoted to 
sexual jealousy (Buss, 2000). Like the fear circuits in the amygdala, these reacts to 
special inputs such as unusual scents or violations of rule about personal space and uses 
special-purpose computational algorithms to decide that a partner is committing adultery, 
often far in advance of any evidence that would provide rational grounds for that belief. 
The jealousy module in men causes them to behave violently to their partner as a 
deterrent to possible adultery, and Buss has speculated that it may even contain special 
rules for spouse-murder. Although better founded than, for example, Victor Johnston’s 
suggestion that women experience negative emotions during menstruation to encourage 
them to get pregnant next time (Johnston, 1999: 135), Buss’s claims still do not have the 
scientific credentials of Ekman’s claims about the basic emotions or LeDoux’s analysis 
of the fear circuits. Nevertheless, the basic emotions approach has been very successful, 
leading to one of the few areas of consensus in the science of emotion. It is only 
understandable if some psychologists believe that the correct approach is more of the 
same. Ekman himself has suggested a more extended list of sixteen basic emotions, 
amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, 
guilt, pride in achievement, relief, sadness/distress, satisfaction, sensory pleasure and 
shame (Ekman, 1999). In contrast to most other advocates of an extended basic emotions 
approach, however, Ekman continues to insist that basic emotions are a distinctive class 
of psychological phenomena marked out by their automaticity, by unique behavioral and 
physiological signatures and by the existence of homologous states in other primates. His 
believes that empirical evidence of these features will probably be forthcoming for the 
states on his extended list.  More doctrinaire evolutionary psychologists resist the demand 
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for such evidence. Steven Gaulin and Donald McBurney argue that it is inappropriate to 
demand that an emotion have a distinctive facial expression, since it may be more 
adaptive to keep emotions secret (a view discussed at more length below). They suggest 
that many emotions are unique to humans, have no homologues in other primates and so 
cannot be studied using the comparative method. Finally, they urge that the recognition 
of new emotional adaptations should not be prevented by the inability of current 
measurement techniques to identify any distinctive physiology associated with that 
adaptation (Gaulin & McBurney, 2001: 264-7). While in line with the general theoretical 
position adopted by many contemporary evolutionary psychologists (Cosmides & Tooby, 
2000), these arguments threaten to extend the meaning of ‘basic emotion’ to cover just 
about any phenomenon in the general domain of motivation and emotion for which a 
plausible evolutionary rationale can be suggested. Ekman’s approach has the advantage 
that it identifies a range of broadly comparable and individually well-characterized 
psychological states. I have argued elsewhere that the methodological value of a list of 
basic emotions is to have a list of states of more or less the same kind, so that we can look 
for psychological and neurological principles about states of that kind (Griffiths, 1997). 
 
In contrast to the evolutionary psychologists, the other currently popular attempt to build 
a more general theory on the foundation of the basic emotions draws a fundamental 
distinction between ‘primary’ (basic) and ‘secondary’ emotions. This is the revival of the 
early C20 James/Lange theory in the work of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio and his 
philosophical interpreters (Charland, 1995; Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 1999; Prinz, 
Forthcoming). These authors have argued that the phenomenology that accompanies 
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basic emotions is the perception of bodily changes caused by the subcortical circuits that 
drive those responses. They argue further that these 'somatic appraisals' play important 
functional roles in cognition and action. More complex emotions involve subtly 
differentiated somatic appraisals and cognitive activity realized in the neo-cortex that 
accompanies some combination of basic emotions. Primary emotions are part of our 
evolutionary inheritance, shared by all normal humans and tied to specific types of 
stimuli. Secondary emotions are acquired during development, show cultural and 
individual variation and are sensitive to more complex and abstract features of the 
stimulus situation. This approach identifies each emotion with one type of somatic 
appraisal and focuses on the functions of emotions in the internal, cognitive economy of 
the organism. 
 
In this paper, however, I want to introduce and explore a very different strategy for 
building on the basic emotions to illuminate complex emotional episodes. The strategy 
draws on recent work by 'transactional' psychologists of emotion (Fridlund, 1994; 
Fridlund, 1989; Parkinson, 1995). In contrast to somatic appraisal theorists, these 
theorists focus on the functions of emotion in interactions between organisms rather than 
their function in the organism’s internal cognitive economy. From a transactional 
perspective, emotions are moves people make as they negotiate how they will be treated 
by others and how they will think of themselves and their situation in life. Sulking, for 
example, in which people sabotage what would normally be mutually rewarding 
interactions with a social or sexual partner and reject attempts at reconciliation after 
conflict, can be seen as a strategy for seeking a better global deal in that particular 
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relationship. People sulk because of what sulking will achieve, as much or more than 
because of what has happened. Interpretations of emotional behavior as ‘strategic’ or 
goal-directed behavior are a familiar feature of the literature on the ‘social construction’ 
of emotions (Griffiths, 1997: 137-167). The work I discuss here is significantly different, 
because it takes a ‘strategic’ or goal-directed perspective on the basic emotions and 
locates the origins of these features of emotion in an evolutionary account of mind. I 
suggest that a socially-oriented (‘Machiavellian’) perspective on the basic emotions can 
be incorporated into a theory of extended emotion episodes containing many emotional 
and cognitive events as parts - what Ekman has called ‘emotion plots’ (Ekman, 1999: 55) 
– in such a way as to provide biological underpinnings for ideas that have traditionally 
been associated with social constructionist or more generally culture-based account of 
emotion.  
 
5. Emotions as Social Transactions  
There is a fundamental evolutionary puzzle about the conventional view that basic 
emotions have obligate facial expressions. Why would evolution produce organisms that 
are obliged to continually inform friend and enemy alike about their motivation and 
likely future behavior?  As discussed above, some evolutionary psychologists have 
disputed Ekman’s longstanding view that each evolved emotion has a distinctive facial 
signature. They argue that this will only be true for those emotions that it is in the 
interests of the organism to reveal.  The best-known advocate of this view, however, is 
Alan Fridlund (Fridlund, 1994). Rather than arguing that there will be some emotions 
with facial signatures and some without, Fridlund makes a general prediction across the 
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whole range of emotions that organisms will produce displays when it is advantageous 
for them to do so and not at other times. Emotional behaviors, he argues, are primarily 
signals to other organisms and as such their production takes account of the presence of 
other organisms and of their relationship to the organism producing the display.  
 
Several psychologists have conducted experiments to test this perspective on emotion, 
mostly seeking to find ‘audience effects’ - cases in which social context influences 
whether a particular stimulus elicits emotional behavior. For example, José Miguel 
Fernández-Dols and María-Angeles Ruiz-Belda have documented audience effects on the 
production of the so-called ‘true smile’ -  the pan-cultural expression of happiness 
(Fernández-Dols & Ruiz-Belda, 1997). In a study of Spanish soccer fans they found that 
a wide range of facial, vocal and other behavior occurred when the favored team scored a 
goal. Smiles, however, occurred almost exclusively when one fan turned to another and 
sought to share their enthusiasm.  Fernández-Dols and Ruiz-Belda found the same pattern 
in medal winners at the 1992 Barcelona Olympics. Gold medalists produced many signs 
of emotion during the medal ceremony, but smiled almost exclusively when interacting 
with the audience and officials. They concluded that happiness merely facilitates smiling, 
making it more likely to occur when the actual precipitating factor is present. That 
precipitating factor is a social interaction in which one person seeks to affiliate with 
another. Obviously, people do smile and produce other classical emotional expressions 
when they are alone, but several studies suggest that they do so much less often than we 
suppose. Even such apparently reflexive displays as faces produced in response to tastes 
and smells appear to be more marked in a social setting than in solitary subjects 
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(Fridlund, 1994: 155-7). There are also different ways of being ‘alone’. Fridlund has 
shown that solitary subjects who are mentally picturing themselves as taking part in a 
social interaction produce more emotional facial signals than subjects thinking only of the 
emotional stimulus and how it makes them feel. Fridlund has described this as ‘ implicit 
sociality’ and remarked that his subjects display to the ‘audience in their heads’(Fridlund, 
1994; Fridlund et al., 1990). 
 
Experiments like these are open to objection that they merely reveal the operation of what 
Ekman has termed terms ‘cultural display rules’. According to the display rule 
conception, the occurrence of an emotion always initiates a set of expressive movements, 
give or take a few caveats about stimulus intensity, but subjects sometimes prevent those 
movements from actually occurring by utilizing the same muscles in a voluntary 
movement pattern. The operation of a display rule can become as automatic as any other, 
habitually performed action. Fully enculturated adults can respond to social cues that 
require them to modulate the expression of emotions as smoothly and unconsciously as 
they respond to features of the traffic when driving. In a well-known experiment, Ekman 
and his collaborators showed American and Japanese college students neutral and stress 
inducing films while they were alone in a room.  The repertoire of facial behaviors shown 
during the stress phase by the two sets of subjects was very similar.  However, when an 
experimenter was introduced into the room and asked questions about the subject's 
emotions as the stress film was shown again, the facial behavior of the Japanese diverged 
radically from that of the Americans (Ekman, 1971, 1972). Ekman interpreted this as the 
operation of a cultural display rule in Japanese subjects, a rule forbidding the expression 
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of negative emotions in the presence of authority figures. In support of this interpretation, 
he was able to document the momentary onset of negative emotional expressions prior to 
formation of the characteristic final facial configuration of the Japanese subjects. This 
phenomenon of emotion ‘leakage’ helps make clear the difference between the display 
rule and transactionalist theories of the social modulation of emotion. For Ekman, the 
emotion process itself is distinct from the process of strategically modulating information 
flow. The automatic appraisal system which triggers an affect program takes no notice of 
display rules. Instead, the affect program response and the display rule compete for 
control of output systems. Leakage is a side effect of the intrinsically conflict-based 
architecture of this system for controlling emotional behavior. For the transactionalist, 
however, the strategic modulation of information flow is an intimate part of the emotion 
process itself. If leakage occurs, it must have some strategic function.  
 
There is a standard transactionalist account of the strategic function of ‘leakage’, an 
account that can be traced back to the work of the ethologist Robert A Hinde (Hinde, 
1985a, 1985b). Hinde’s flagship examples are threat displays in birds, which, he argued, 
are adaptive either as bluffs or because the display elicited in response provides 
information that the first bird can use to assess its options. In neither case is the 
probability of the threat display, or its intensity, a simple consequence of the probability 
that the bird will attack (or, anthropomorphically, of ‘how angry it is’). Hinde used a 
distinction between emotional ‘expression’ and emotional ‘negotiation’ to mark the 
difference between his view of emotion signals and the views of earlier ethologists 
(Hinde, 1985a, 1985b). Emotional displays seen as expressions of emotion are 
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unconditional predictors of future behavior, in the sense that they reveal a motivational 
state that will persist and explain the future behavior. Emotional displays seen as 
negotiation are conditional predictors of behavior. They predict how the first organism 
will behave if one or more organisms make one or other of a range of possible response. 
The second kind of display does not reveal an enduring motivational state, because the 
organism’s future emotional state will depend on how other organisms respond to the 
display. Hinde suggested that “emotional behavior may lie along a continuum from 
behavior that is more or less expressive to behavior concerned primarily with a process of 
negotiation between individuals.’ (Hinde, 1985a: 989). Fridlund compares these 
ethological ideas to a study on human lying which contrasted two conditions, one in 
which subjects lied to keep secret a surprise birthday party, and one on which they lied to 
avoid telling someone the painful truth. In the latter condition, but not the former, 
subjects equivocated (Bavelas, Black, Chovil, & Mullett, 1990). Fridlund draws a parallel 
between the ambiguous speech of these human agents, who are conflicted as to whether 
to tell the truth or to avoid an unpleasant personal interaction, and animals unsure 
whether to flight or flee. Both use ambiguous signals of intention to probe the likely 
response of the audience to an action. From this perspective ‘leakage’ is not the result of 
the architecture of the brain, but an adaptive behavior in which animals both convey 
information to others and obtain information that helps them form a more definite 
motivation. 
 
Since Hinde wrote, the concept of ‘Machiavellian intelligence’ has moved to center stage 
in discussions of the evolution of human cognition (Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Whiten & 
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Byrne, 1997). Intelligence is ‘Machiavellian’ to the extent that the evolutionary forces 
which shaped it concern social competition within primate groups. Machiavellian 
intelligence is the result of an intra-species arms race in which increased intelligence at 
the level of the population merely raises the bar for success at the level of the individual. 
Hinde’s seminal papers were a response to developments in behavioral ecology in the 
1970s, particularly in the theory of animal signaling, which prefigure the Machiavellian 
intelligence concept. His concept of emotional negotiation and the general idea that 
emotions are social transactions are therefore very naturally regarded as applications of 
the Machiavellian intelligence perspective to emotion, an idea embodied in the title of 
this paper.  Like more traditional conceptions of intelligence, emotions are Machiavellian 
in a general sense simply to the extent that they find their dominant evolutionary 
functions in social competition.  It is, however, useful to distinguish some more specific 
ways in which emotion may be ‘Machiavellian’.  A fundamental distinction, and one that 
is particularly useful in reconstructing the debate between Ekman and Fridlund, is 
between the Machiavellian expression of emotion and the Machiavellian production of 
emotion. It seems to be common ground, at least amongst theorists who are prepared to 
interpret human emotion as a product of evolution, that the expression of emotion is 
Machiavellian. The contextual factors that predict whether an emotion is expressed are of 
the sort that are likely to have been significant in human evolution - factors such as 
conformity to group standards and the status of the individual in the group. The 
sensitivity of emotional expression to such factors is very plausibly part of our evolved 
social competence. This need not imply, of course, that the specific rules to which 
individuals conform in one culture or another can be explained in evolutionary terms. 
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Evolution can be equally relevant when the task is to understand how cultures generate 
their patterns of difference from a shared developmental system. The generic fact that 
there are display rules, for example, is very likely to have an evolutionary explanation. 
Learning to utilize evolved facial expressions appropriately in a social setting turns out to 
be as critical for infant monkeys as it is for infant humans (see below). 
 
If the Machiavellian expression of emotions is common ground amongst evolutionary 
theorists of emotion, the Machiavellian production of emotion is a more controversial 
idea. A Machiavellian perspective on the production of emotion would imply something 
like the following: 
 
The Machiavellian Emotion Hypothesis: Emotional appraisal is sensitive to cues 
that predict the value to the emotional agent of responding to the situation with a 
particular emotion, as well as cues that indicate the significance of the stimulus 
situation to the agent independently of the agent’s response. 
 
Put in the language of appraisal theories, the hypothesis is that the appraisal hyperspace 
has ‘strategic’ dimensions. Current appraisal theories identify multiple dimensions that 
assess the organism-relative significance of what has happened. The Machiavellian 
emotions hypothesis predicts that there will also be dimensions that assess the payoff to 
the organism of having the emotion. Putting the hypothesis in more philosophical terms, 
the emotional appraisal ascribes to the environment the property of affording a certain 
strategy of social interaction. This process, like the process described by Frijda, might 
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operate in ‘ continuous updating mode’ leading to a continuous modulation of the 
organisms strategies of interaction. 
 
A Machiavellian theory of the production of basic emotions might apply to any or all 
levels of appraisal. First, the triggering of basic emotions via the slower, ‘high road’ 
structures might display an evolved sensitivity to social context. Although this idea seems 
plausible I am going to put less emphasis on it, for two reasons. First, I suspect that the 
behavioral consequences of this high-level process would be very be hard to distinguish 
empirically from the operation of complex display rules or from the effect of broader 
aspects of the psychology of emotion that fall under the general rubric of ‘coping 
processes’. Second, I will suggest below that some of the best evidence for a 
Machiavellian perspective on the production of emotions comes from work on non-
human animals, work which probably illuminates the ‘low road’ to emotion. I will 
concentrate, therefore, on the idea that the ‘low road’- Ekman’s ‘automatic appraisal 
mechanism’ - may display an evolved sensitivity to social context that is Machiavellian 
in nature.  
 
Most of the evidence so far produced by transactional psychologists working with human 
subjects can be accounted for by a Machiavellian perspective on the expression of 
emotion, without endorsing the more radical thesis of Machiavellian production. 
Research on audience effects is intrinsically unsuited to distinguishing the hypothesis that 
an emotion does not occur in inappropriate social contexts (Machiavellian production) 
from the hypothesis that it is not expressed in those contexts (Machiavellian expression). 
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As I have sketched above, the existence of emotion ‘leakage’ does not straightforwardly 
discriminate between these two interpretations. Nor does the persistence of reduced levels 
of emotional behavior in asocial settings, which can be accounted for by Fridlund’s 
concept of ‘implicit sociality’ (displaying to the audience in your head), an explanation 
that has some empirical support. Studies of the eliciting conditions for emotions are more 
likely to be able to discriminate between Machiavellian expression and Machiavellian 
production. One intriguing study, based on retrospective self-report of actual emotion 
episodes, found that the occurrence of anger rather than sadness as the response to a loss 
was predicted, not only by traditionally recognized factors such as intentional action by a 
human agent or breach of a norm of behavior, but also by the possibility of obtaining 
restitution or compensation, a finding that seems to fit the Machiavellian emotion 
hypothesis (Stein, Trabasso, & Liwag, 1993). However, the best evidence I can currently 
find for the existence of Machiavellian factors in emotion production comes from studies 
on non-human animals. These studies also suggest that Ekman’s concept of a display rule 
needs to be amended in a way that makes even Machiavellian expression a more integral 
part of the actual emotion process that it at first seems.  
 
6. Machiavellian Emotion in Animals 
Audience effects are common in animals. In one well-known study, Peter Marler and 
Christopher Evans found sophisticated audience effects in Golden Sebright chickens. 
These birds give two alarm calls, one for aerial predators and another for terrestrial 
predators. Although solitary chickens are clearly afraid when they see an aerial predator, 
they do not produce the relevant alarm call. Likewise, male chickens call excitedly when 
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they find food, but only if there are female chickens in the vicinity. The evolutionary 
rationale for these audience effects is obvious: there is no point warning chickens who 
aren’t there or demonstrating foraging ability to other males. Marler and Evans say that 
their findings are compatible with Ekman’s concept of display rules. The solitary 
chickens show many other signs of fear when they see an aerial predator, and they may 
still be excited by finding food even when they produce no calls. But the very application 
of the display rule concept to chickens involves a very significant revision of that 
concept. Display rules those were originally introduced as ‘learnt, cultural display rules’ 
(Ekman, 1972). Their function was to explain how earlier researchers had been misled 
about the extent of cultural variability in human emotion, as gauged by facial behavior. 
The suggestion was that basic emotions and their facial displays are part of humanity’s 
evolutionary heritage, but are modified differently in every culture as a result of social 
learning. The chicken ‘display rules’, however, are not culture-specific but species-
typical, and it is most unlikely that their development in individual chickens requires 
learning in the sense that a human infant might be supposed to acquire a display rule by 
imitation or by reinforcement of initial performances. In Marler and Evans’s usage, the 
concept of a display rule has is reduced to marking the bare distinction between 
Machiavellian expression and Machiavellian emotion outlined in the previous section. 
The chicken’s appraisal of what it has found as a high value food item and its consequent 
emotional state have an existence independent of the chicken’s Machiavellian decision to 
reveal this emotion to conspecifics.   
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I will suggest below that the distinction between having an emotion and expressing it 
may be distinctly problematic in non-human subject. But even if the role of 
Machiavellian processes in simple minds is restricted to the expression of independently 
existing emotional states, this carries an important message for the study of human 
emotions. It provides a powerful argument against the idea that Machiavellian processes 
imply the sort of sophisticated cognitive abilities that naturally come to mind when we 
hear phrases like ‘negotiation’ and ‘sensitivity to social context’. The existence of 
audience effects in animals is in tension with some basic stereotypes about emotion. 
Emotions are the paradigm of something that happens without regard for the 
consequences. Emotions are also stereotypically ‘biological’. Something sounds right in 
Konrad Lorenz’s epigram that animals are highly emotional people of limited 
intelligence: emotions are part of our ‘animal nature’. Producing or suppressing behaviors 
so as to take account of social relationships, however, seems like a complex, cognitive 
achievement. It suggests processes that involve deliberation, perhaps even conscious 
deliberation. So the idea that the emotion system implements strategies of social 
interaction naturally suggests the idea that these aspects of emotion are learnt, and 
perhaps culture-specific, rather than being part of our evolutionary heritage. But this 
inference may well be entirely spurious. The existence of sophisticated audience effects 
in animals suggests that the social, manipulative aspects of emotion may be as 
evolutionarily ancient as any others. The appraisal process that sets off a transparently 
Machiavellian response like sulking may very well resemble the ancient, ‘low road’ to 
fear uncovered by LeDoux.  
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Further support for this perspective comes from the vital role of emotion in primate social 
cognition. The role of experience in the development of emotional responses in primates 
is well known. A series of deprivation experiments conducted in the 1960s by Harry F. 
Harlow and his collaborators demonstrated the vital role of appropriate social contact in 
the development of the emotional phenotype in the rhesus macaque (Harlow, 1986). 
Moneys deprived of appropriate social interaction as infants are unable to interact 
effectively with peers, including sexual partners. An inability to respond to social contact 
with positive emotion, or with appropriate levels of negative emotion, seems to be an 
important mechanism producing these social deficits. It is also well known that lesions to 
the amygdala, the likely seat of much affective computation, produce severe social 
dysfunction in rhesus monkeys (Emery & Amaral, 2000). These results, however, involve 
damage to the emotional phenotype that is too devastating to allow any evaluation of the 
Machiavellian emotion hypothesis, as opposed to the uncontroversial general claim that 
the emotions play an important role in social behavior. Other studies, however, have 
uncovered subtler deficits. William Mason reports that rhesus macaques deprived of 
social contact as infants produce a range of grossly normal facial behaviors which are 
generally interpreted as expressions of fear (grimace), friendliness (lipsmacking) and 
threat (threat faces) (Mason, 1985). What seems to be lacking in these animals is an 
ability to utilize these facial expressions to manage their relationships with other 
monkeys. Mason reports two dysfunctional patterns of behavior that are particularly 
interesting in the context of the present discussion. Normal monkeys use facial affiliation 
signals to form alliances to defeat dominant individuals and to maintain confidence in 
each other’s support during that project. Socially deprived monkeys are unable to 
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accomplish this. They also fail, unlike normal monkeys, to use facial expressions to 
redirect aggression from dominants against third parties. Mason explains these results in 
terms of the role of social experience in elaborating complex eliciting conditions for 
emotional behavior. Infant monkeys begin by producing these behaviors in response to 
relatively simple, context independent stimuli. Later on, ‘As a result of functional 
elaborations, refinements, and transformations of the schemata [of elicitors for expressive 
behavior] present in early infancy, experience creates new sources of social order, new 
possibilities for the regulation and control of social life.’ (Mason 1985: 147). The 
monkeys, in other words, learn to produce the same behaviors in response to subtler, 
context dependent stimuli, and by doing so are able to manage their social interactions 
with other animals in a rewarding manner. 
 
One possible interpretation of these results is that socially skilled, adult monkeys 
experience emotions in the same way as the socially deprived monkeys, but have learnt to 
suppress them when they are socially inconvenient or fake them when they are socially 
useful. This interpretation confines Machiavellian social cognition to the management of 
social expression and excludes it from emotion production. Frankly, however, it is hard to 
attach any operational meaning to the idea that rhesus monkeys pretend to feel friendship 
for one another or pretend to be angry. It is easier to make sense of the inverse claim that 
they pretend not to have emotions. Perhaps some emotional responses are repressed by a 
relatively automatic version of a display rule, but it seems equally conceivable that the 
production of emotional responses is inhibited by the cues that might be supposed to 
figure in that display rule, so that, for instance, actions that might generate anger if 
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performed by a subordinate or equal simply do not generate anger when performed by a 
dominant. Contextual inhibition of this kind is consistent with the neural connectivity of 
the primate amygdala (Emery & Amaral, 2000: 167). The positive case, in which rhesus 
monkeys pretend to have emotions, is really quite implausible. When an animal produces 
a threat display but flees when challenged, as occurs in the examples Hinde used to 
introduce the idea of emotional negotiation, this can be described in functional terms as a 
‘bluff’. This, unfortunately, invites an anthropomorphic interpretation in which the 
organism is acting angry but not feeling angry. If that interpretation means anything there 
must be a distinction between genuine (‘sincere’) agonistic displays and fakes. The very 
idea of human anger seems to presume a fixed relationship between the production of 
displays and the motivation of later behavior that runs counter to the idea of regarding an 
agonistic display as a behavior in its own right. Yet, in the case of animals, that is exactly 
what ethologists do.  
 
The fact that the concept of emotional sincerity seems largely otiose in the study of 
animal cognition explains why the transactional perspective on emotion emerged quite 
rapidly after the abandonment of the classical ethological theory of drives. For Konrad 
Lorenz, an emotion was the subjective aspect of the performance of an instinctive 
behavior. The sequence of behavior leading up to this ‘consummatory act’ is driven by 
the accumulation of ‘action-specific energy’ in a reservoir. If the behavior is prevented by 
the presence of an inhibiting stimulus, this energy ‘overflows’ to produce ‘displacement 
activities’ (Lorenz, 1996). In the classic example, a cat confronting a rival but unwilling 
to attack begins to wash itself. In this context, unexpressed emotions serve to explain an 
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apparently observable phenomena: “I think it is probable that displacements do serve a 
function as outlets, through a safety valve, of dangerous surplus impulses” (Tinbergen, 
1952: 52). However, the drive-discharge model of instinctive behavior was rejected by 
most students of animal behavior by the early 1960s e.g. (Hinde, 1956). The idea of 
unexpressed emotions in animals came to seem like nothing more than unwarranted 
anthropomorphism. The complex relationship between emotional behavior and 
motivational states was conceptualized instead through a strategic understanding of the 
role of those behaviors in social interaction. In the seminal papers cited above, Hinde 
brought this perspective home to the study of emotion in humans. 
 
7. Machiavellian Emotions in Humans 
There is a straightforward evolutionary continuity argument for Machiavellian emotion 
production in humans. The automatic appraisal system in humans is homologous to the 
corresponding emotional appraisal system in other primates. If primates exhibit 
sensitivity to strategically significant features of social context it seems likely that the 
hominid line began its divergence from other primates already equipped with this ability. 
The Machiavellian intelligence perspective suggests that the ability to negotiate social 
relationships was the dominant factor driving the evolution of increased human cognitive 
ability. Given these background presuppositions, it seems highly unlikely that the 
emotion system would lose its sensitivity to social context during human evolution. 
 
What would a Machiavellian theory of human emotion production look like?  Numerous 
emotion theorists have suggested that emotions may be self-serving, occurring not when 
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the situation objectively warrants the judgment embodied in the emotional appraisal, but 
rather when it suite the agent to interpret the situation in this light. Jean Paul Sartre 
famously took this view (Sartre, 1962). Emotions are a class of mental processes in which 
people regain psychic equilibrium by altering their perception of reality rather than 
altering reality itself. Affective cognition is thus like the fable of the sour grapes - unable 
to discharge the desire for the grapes by obtaining them, we discharge it by ascribing to 
the grapes the property of being undesirable. Likewise, according to Sartre, anger 
ascribes to a person the property of being hateful precisely because he stands between the 
agent and the satisfaction of her desires. That is the difference between the emotion of 
anger and rational coping with the conflicting needs of others. In anger, rather than give 
up some of our desires, we reinterpret the world to allow us to hang on to them. 
According to Sartre, the involvement of the body in emotion is a device for turning these 
psychic acts into involuntary happenings. Sartre compares a person in the grip of emotion 
to the florid hysterics of the Salpetrie. Emotions are psychosomatic symptoms used to 
make our pretences real to ourselves and to others. Emotions as Sartre describes them are 
intrinsically pathological - a form of bad faith in which people reject reality out of mental 
weakness. But the central insight of his theory is independent of this judgment: people 
can use emotions to view the world in a light that is psychologically more rewarding to us 
than other possible interpretations. Highly adaptive versions of this process are described 
in the literature on ‘emotional intelligence’, such as using an emotional reinterpretation of 
the situation to motivate oneself (Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer, 2000). Viewed 
from the perspective of contemporary emotional intelligence literature, Sartre’s work 
 33
seems like an insightful account of human psychology marred by the French philosophers 
penchant for calling a spade a conspiracy against the soil.  
 
Sartre concentrates on the intra-personal functions of emotion, in apparent contrast to the 
literature on strategic emotion in animals that focuses of inter-personal functions. But the 
difference between these two is smaller than it at first appears. Transactionalist 
psychologists have stressed the importance of managing self-image as well as social 
image in a functional way, and it is easy to see that these goals can often be accomplished 
simultaneously. By interpreting another’s behavior as unreasonable I can both maintain 
my positive self-image and make an advantageous move in the social negotiation of the 
eventual outcome of my interaction with that person. A person who becomes angry when 
their sexual partner points out that they have failed to do enough around the house, for 
example, might gain both these advantages by focusing on the hurtful way the remark 
was made. 
 
An interesting example with which to develop the Machiavellian perspective is romantic 
love. Most accounts of this emotion regard it as a device to create and maintain long-term 
pair bonds. According to Robert Frank, love is a ‘commitment mechanism’ a guarantee 
that a person will remain committed to a relationship even when temporarily more 
rewarding relationships become available (Frank, 1988). A special emotion is needed for 
this purpose, because simple means-end rationality will dictate choosing the current best 
option at each moment. Melvyn Konner, in contrast, has pointed out that in traditional 
societies few people have the option of forming a long-term pair bond on the basis of 
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romantic attraction.  Instead, he suggests that the irruptive, passionate love that western 
societies treat as the occasion for the formation of life-long partnerships may have as its 
primary evolutionary function motivating behaviors such as mate desertion and 
copulation outside the pair bond (Konner, 1982: 315-316). This suggestion has become 
more credible since it was first made in the light of the increasing emphasis in behavioral 
ecology on female promiscuity. Females in a wide range of species search for the ‘best 
genes’ independent of the need in many of the same species to maintain a stable bond 
with a single male to provide economic support for offspring. In humans, mate desertion 
and promiscuity are risky behaviors as far as immediate survival goes. They carry a high 
probability of agonistic interactions with other members of the group. If the advantages 
of these behaviors for reproductive fitness are great enough, however, love might evolve 
as a special motivational system designed, not to enforce commitment when impulse 
argues against it, but to motivate adultery when prudence argues against it. Both theories 
represent evolutionary just-so-stories, with all their attendant uncertainty. But if the 
adultery theory were correct it would dovetail interestingly with some ideas about love 
from the social constructionist tradition. Constructionists have emphasized the role of 
emotions as ‘excuses’ - ways to move socially sanctioned behavior into the realm of 
passive, involuntary, and thus excusable behavior. The existence of recognized ‘excuses’ 
also allows society to tolerate a certain amount of deviance without the complete 
breakdown of social norms. The use of love to excuse mate desertion is one instance to 
which this model could be applied. The obvious problem with the constructionist theory 
is that it requires both the individual emotional agent and their society to be sincerely 
convinced that the behavior is involuntary.  In earlier work I suggested that the 
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internalization of a cultural model of behavior in childhood might do the requisite work 
of ‘naturalizing’ the behavior and making its function invisible to those who enact it 6. If 
the adultery theory of the evolution of love is correct, however, then a process of this 
kind would have ample biological material to work with. It would simply be a matter of 
hyper-cognizing a certain kind of emotional experience and establishing cultural 
narratives in which it figures and which would be cited to explain, and implicitly excuse, 
desertion. The same narratives might serve the intra-personal function of allowing the 
individual to regard themselves as swept along by impersonal forces and thus maintain a 
positive self-image in the face of the damage caused to other people by their behavior.  
 
The ideas of the last paragraph are grossly speculative. I include them merely to make a 
general, theoretical point about the impact of the Machiavellian emotion perspective on 
emotion theory. A Machiavellian perspective on the basic emotions would allow a much 
tighter integration of biological and cultural theories of emotion. This would be true even 
if Machiavellian processes are restricted to the management of emotional expression, so 
long as those processes occur as an intimate part of the evolved emotion system. The 
basic emotions represent some of the key building blocks of complex emotion episodes. 
These episodes are more than just the sum of their constituent parts, but they also, 
inevitably, reflect the nature of those parts. What we might learn from ethological work 
on the Machiavellian nature of emotional behavior in animal on the one hand and social 
transactional account of human psychologists on the other, is to stop contrasting 
                                                 
6 For an analysis of social constructionism about emotion, see (Griffiths, 1997, Ch 6). The idea of love as a 
socially accepted excuse for adultery was first suggested to me by Peter Forrest. 
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spontaneous emotions with strategic, perhaps even manipulative, social interaction. Basic 
emotion processes and complex, culturally situated emotion episodes may, as it were, 
speak the same language. Emotion may be Machiavellian all the way down. 
 
8. Conclusion 
I have suggested that the basic emotions may be ‘ Machiavellian’ in their expression and 
possibly also in their production, meaning that they show an evolved sensitivity to 
strategically significant aspects of the organism’s social context. The best evidence for 
this, I suggest, is the presence of sophisticated social cognition in animals, where it is 
problematic to postulate complex psychological processes such as self-deceit and 
pretence. What is plausible for animal emotion, I have argued, is also plausible for low-
level processes in human emotion. Finally, I have suggested that some of the narratives 
about self-serving or manipulative emotion associated with social constructionist 
accounts of emotion are easier to believe if these emotion episodes have biological 
underpinnings that take account of the organism’s strategic situation at a sub-personal 
level. My suggestion is analogous to Alfred Mele’s recent suggestion that self-deception 
can be generated by a set of simple cognitive biases that produce the appearance of a 
person choosing to believe something they know to be false (Mele, 2001). Similarly, a 
strategically sensitive emotion system might give rise to emotion episodes that appear 
self-serving and manipulative without the agent forming a plan to pursue their social 
interests or engage in manipulation.  
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